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THE NEW POLITICS OF PORNOGRAPHY. By Donald A. Downs. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press. 1989. Pp. xxiv, 198. Cloth, $42; 
paper, $14.95. 
Donald Downs'1 The New Politics of Pornography asserts that radi-
cal feminist anti-pornography legislation is inconsistent with the lib-
eral model of the first amendment. This assertion will be nothing new 
to radical feminists; they have heard it before and have said it them-
selves. 2 Downs takes the argument one step further and attempts to 
establish that the liberal model of the first amendment is superior to 
progressive models that might accommodate the radical feminist posi-
tion. The proof is simple: the liberal model is conducive to free 
speech, while progressive models are not. Yet just when things are 
looking bleak for the radical feminists, Downs attempts to placate 
them with a "compromise": a new definition of pornography that re-
stricts only violent obscene materials. What Downs fails to realize is 
that a compromise between obscenity law and anti-pornography law is 
not possible: traditional obscenity law accommodates community 
norms even as feminist anti-pornography law deconstructs them. 
Downs' "compromise" is simply his preference for societal expressions 
of morality over individual accounts of subjugation. 
The New Politics of Pornography attacks the extremism Downs be-
lieves typical of the present pornography debate, particularly on the 
part of radical feminists Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacK.innon 
(p. xvii). Dworkin and MacK.innon assert that pornography creates 
sexual inequality, silencing the voices of women within the first 
amendment marketplace. They argue that mere facial, or procedural, 
equality is inadequate: treating unequally placed parties in an equal 
fashion does not result in "substantive equality."3 If women are to 
achieve substantive equality within the first amendment, they believe, 
society must restrict pornographic speech. 
Dworkin and MacK.innon drafted anti-pornography ordinances 
that were enacted in Indianapolis and Minneapolis, creating a civil 
cause of action against the producers of materials that depict "the sex-
ually explicit subordination of women, graphically or in words."4 
1. Donald Downs is currently an associate professor of political science at the University of 
Wisconsin at Madison. He is the author of NAZIS JN SKOKIE: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986). 
2. See MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POLY. REv. 335-36 (1984). See gener-
ally West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988). 
3. See MacK.innon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 
4-5 (1985). 
4. The Minneapolis ordinance defined pornography as "the sexually explicit subordination of 
women, graphically or in words,'' in which 
(i) women are presented as sexual objects, things, or commodities; or 
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Such restrictions, Downs believes, threaten the core of a liberal model 
of the first amendment (p. 5). In contrast, Downs "advocate[s] legal 
tolerance and endorse[s] preserving the liberal core of general First 
Amendment law for expression that may possess intellectual value" 
(p. xxiv). 
Part I of The New Politics of Pomography sets forth the conception 
of the liberal first amendment doctrine Downs defends (pp. 1-33). Ac-
cording to Downs, the liberal model of the first amendment "assumes 
that the individual citizen is autonomous and responsible," so that lib-
eral conceptions of equality are limited to state neutrality (p. 5). This 
conception can accommodate only the exceptions necessary to protect 
individual rights, or to account for speech that is closely aligned to 
action (p. 5). Downs believes that radical feminist anti-pornography 
efforts are inherently inconsistent with this model because they seek to 
disfavor speech that harms women as a group. 
Downs follows this argument with three sections detailing the pro-
cedural history of the anti-pornography ordinances in Minneapolis 
and Indianapolis. 5 He is particularly critical of the roles played by 
MacKinnon and Dworkin in the legislative processes. For example, in 
the Minneapolis debate, MacKinnon and Dworkin acted as both con-
sultants to the city council and lobbyists for the ordinance (p. 61). 
According to Downs, this led to almost totalitarian one-sidedness of 
debate, characterized by emotional hearings where women expressed 
their "uncompromising rage" at their perceived victimization (pp. 68-
69). Downs asserts that this "psychology of victimization ... jeopard-
ized objectivity and perspective," resulting in a process that was 
"more therapeutic than objective" (pp. 71-72). Dworkin's and Mac-
Kinnon's "questionable tactics" (p. 113) caught both council members 
and potential opponents of the ordinances unprepared. Thus, the or-
dinances were railroaded through their respective city councils, sup-
ported; by members who either did not understand the radical feminist 
premises on which the ordinances were based (pp. 120-21), or who 
were afraid of appearing "pro-pornography" to their constituents (pp. 
(ii) women are presented as objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or 
(iii) women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being raped; 
or 
(iv) women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or 
physically hurt; or 
(v) women are presented in postures of sexual submission or sexual servility, including by 
inviting penetration; or 
(vi) women's body parts - including but not limited to vaginas, breasts, and buttocks -
are exhibited, such that women are reduced to those parts; or 
(vii) women are presented as whores by nature; or 
(vii) women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or 
(ix) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, torture, shown as filthy or 
inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual. 
P. 44. The Indianapolis ordinance was struck down by the Seventh Circuit in American Book-
sellers Assn. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), ajfd. 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
5. See Parts II-IV, pp. 34-143. 
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126-27). By allowing these ordinances to pass in so "disconcerting" a 
fashion (p. 143), these councils, in Downs' words, failed to "live[] up 
to [their] First Amendment obligations" (p. 142). 
After alleging the legal illegitimacy of the radical feminist anti-por-
nography ordinances, Downs attacks their theoretical legitimacy. 
Part V asserts the superiority of the liberal model of the first amend-
ment over the progressive models that would accommodate radical 
feminist efforts to achieve substantive equality (pp. 144-98). Identify-
ing the first amendment as "one of the last bastions of liberal norms" 
(p. 147), Downs asserts the validity of the liberal model as a historical 
matter. According to Downs, a liberal first amendment has protected 
dissent and controversial speech throughout the civil rights move-
ment, the Vietnam War, and indeed, the feminist movement itself (pp. 
147-48). "Content neutrality guarantees that groups competing in a 
context of cultural pluralism all will enjoy the right to express their 
views and attempt to influence public and legal opinion" (p. 148). 
Downs acknowledges that "dominant discourses prevail over less 
dominant ones and there is not perfect competition among ideas" (p. 
147). Movements of "progressive censorship" (p. 148), however, re-
sult only in oppression. Despite its faults, the liberal approach re-
mains superior to "[a]bsolutist approaches, which attempt to impose 
one view of right and denigrate all others, [and which] have histori-
cally led to hate, repression, and violence directed at those outside the 
new order" (p. 149). In the context of the anti-pornography move-
ment, Downs argues that civil pornography actions may be used as 
harassment mechanisms, and may chill unrestricted speech (pp. 155-
56). The result, in Downs' view, is "a frontal attack on a free intellec-
tual environment" (p. 162). Accordingly, Downs espouses the liberal 
conception of the first amendment over progressive models, including 
radical feminist attempts to achieve substantive equality. 
Downs discusses the possibility of creating a new unprotected 
classification of speech within the liberal model, in the tradition of 
New York v. Ferber 6 and Young v. American Mini Theatres. 7 How-
ever, Downs finds the causal link between pornography and violence 
toward women insufficient to warrant restriction of arguably artistic 
materials. 8 He defends "artful pornography" on the grounds that 
such materials may provide a retreat from and repression of the 
6. 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upheld prohibition on child pornography). 
7. 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upheld zoning restriction on "adult" theatres). 
8. See pp. 165-75; see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 12-17 n.49 (2d 
ed. 1988): 
That many areas of existing first amendment doctrine - ranging from obscenity law to the 
law oflabor-management communications - implicitly tolerate content-based, and perhaps 
even viewpoint-based, controls of speech ... seems an insufficient justification for inviting a 
new, and a particularly dramatic, departure from the overarching principle that government 
should not be empowered to suppress expression based on the rejection of the world view 
that it propounds as evil, or false, or both. 
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human condition that may be necessary to fulfill psychological needs 
(pp. 187-88). Because such speech provides a societal benefit, it should 
not be excluded from the protection of the liberal model of the first 
amendment. 
However, Downs acknowledges that "[e]ven though a predomi-
nantly liberal approach to speech is necessary to maintain an open 
society, the values of the open society are not exclusively libertarian" 
(p. 197). Rather, the liberal model may "entertain non-liberal values 
in areas of expression that do not directly impinge on its political and 
intellectual core" (p. 197). Although artful pornography may benefit 
society by fulfilling psychological needs, Downs believes "[d]emocratic 
society has a right to draw the line of tolerance at the worse, most 
degrading depictions of sex that are unredeemed by art" (p. 188). 
Such depictions "represent not the dialectic of existence but an aban-
donment of responsibility" (p. 188). Excluding these materials recog-
nizes that "values of restraint based on the norms of civility and equal 
respect are necessary to foster a healthier society and cultural plural-
ism" (p. 197). Accordingly, the liberal model of the first amendment 
may accommodate the societal decision to exclude sexually offensive 
materials from first amendment protection. 
Downs believes the present-day obscenity test, as set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 9 adequately represents the soci-
etal decision to exclude those "most degrading sexual depictions." 
The Miller test considers: 
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently 
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value. 10 
The Miller test's societal and legal legitimacy is evidenced by its "es-
tablished track record" (p. 196). The only flaw in the Miller defini-
tion, in Downs' eyes, is its failure to account for sexual violence - the 
key element, he believes, that feminists have brought to the pornogra-
phy debate (p. 188). According to Downs, "there appears to be a 
greater social consensus for restricting violent sexual material than for 
other types" (p. 196). Thus, he "recommend[s] that the concept of 
obscenity either be broadened to include certain forms of violence or 
that violence be dealt with in established obscenity doctrine" (p. 188). 
However, Downs cautions that broadening the definition of ob-
scenity to include ~ll sexual violence would risk the loss of artistic 
material. "Some landmark films like Alfred Hitchcock's Psycho would 
fall by the wayside, as would some scenes from Doctor Zhivago, to 
9. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
10. 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted). 
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name just two artistic examples from an endless list" (p. 191). Fur-
ther, enforcement of such a standard would be ineffectual, as 
pornographers would devise ways to "side-step[] the law" (p. 192). 
Indeed, Downs implies that the plethora of violent sexual images in 
society today is the result of obscenity enforcement.11 Thus, broaden-
ing the Miller definition in societal condemnation of violence would 
threaten the core of the liberal first amendment. 
The only alternative open to Downs is therefore to narrow the 
Miller definition to include only violent obscene materials -
"[p]ortrayals of murder, dismemberment, brutality, or violence in the 
context of obscene acts (that is, those which depict ultimate sexuru 
acts, lewdly displayed naked bodies, or excess of sexual detail)" (p. 
195). By combining society's concern for morality with the concern 
society and radical feminists share for violence, Downs believes he has 
achieved a compromise that may be accommodated by the liberal 
model of the first amendment. 
Downs fails to realize . that compromise between traditional ob-
scenity law and feminist anti-pornography law is not possible. Ob-
scenity law is an effort to legislate morality; anti-pornography law is 
an effort to legislate equality.12 Obscenity law seeks to further stan-
dards of the community; anti-pornography law sees that community 
as a sexual hierarchy, and seeks to prohibit materials that create that 
hierarchy. The test for obscenity is male-oriented: whether or not the 
material produces an erection.13 The test for pornography is female-
oriented: whether or not the material degrades women. In the words 
of MacKinnon, "Obscenity is more concerned with whether men 
blush, pornography with whether women bleed - both producing a 
sexual rush."14 
According to MacKinnon, obscenity law mirrors and reinforces 
the sexual hierarchy that pornography creates. 
In pornography, women are sex. In obscenity law, women are sex. In 
pornography, women's bodies are dirty. In obscenity law, obscenity is 
filth. In pornography, the more explicit the sex, the more pornographic. 
In obscenity law, the more explicit the sex, the more obscene. In por-
nography, sex is a dirty secret. Obscenity law sees it, therefore, helps 
11. P. 192 ("One reason there is so much violence in depictions today is that such depictions 
appeal to primitive sensibilities without running afoul of obscenity law ...• [V]iolent sex is a 
substitute for obscene sex."). But see c. MACKINNON, A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 200 
(1989} ("[M]ore and more violence has become necessary to keep the progressively desensitized 
consumer aroused to the illusion that sex (and he) is daring and dangerous."). 
12. This distinction is evident in the vocabulary of the debate. "The term 'obscenity' refers 
to indecency and filth; the term pornography - derived from the Greek word for 'writing about 
whores' - refers to materials that treat women as prostitutes and that focus on the role of 
women in providing sexual pleasure to men." Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 
1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 595. 
13. See C. MACKINNON supra note 11, at 199-200. 
14. Id. at 199. 
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keep it, that way. Pornography sees nothing wrong with what it does to 
women. Neither does obscenity law. Pornography is socially decried 
but socially permitted. Obscenity is the legal device through which it is 
legally repudiated but legally permitted.is 
Obscenity law does not account for gender distinction or gender op-
pression. It excludes materials radical feminists consider harmless, yet 
protects materials radical feminists find harmful. The sexual focus of 
both obscenity and anti-pornography law creates the illusion of simi-
larity.16 In reality, the two share little beyond their animosity to an 
overlapping set of materials. 
The distinctions between obscenity law and anti-pornography law 
arise from the incompatible theories of social power from which the 
two derive. Obscenity law reflects the morality of the governing com-
munity, a community radical feminists believe reflects the sexual hier-
archy anti-pornography law is intended to eradicate. The New Politics 
of Pornography is thus a paradigm of conservative thought. Downs 
bases his preference for the liberal model of the first amendment in 
history, a classic social conservative position of deference to "the accu-
mulated wisdom of a community's positive conventional morality . 
. . . " 17 He grants the legitimacy of an obscenity exception to the lib-
eral model of the first amendment because it, too, represents societal 
consensus and has achieved legal legitimacy. 18 Downs adds a violence 
prong to the Miller test because there is even greater societal consen-
sus for this narrower definition. 19 Thus, both the present obscenity 
standard and Downs' compromise standard reflect societal mores as 
expressed through social consensus and legal doctrine. 
The feminist model, on the other hand, does not constitute a valid 
exception from the liberal model because it derives its support not 
from community norms, but from individual accounts of harm. 20 
15. Id. at 201. 
16. As Downs describes, Dworkin and MacKinnon took advantage of this overlap by 
recruiting the conservative anti-obscenity votes as well as the radical anti-pornography votes to 
pass the Indianapolis and Minneapolis ordinances. See pp. 34-143. Indeed, Downs hints at some 
degree of hypocrisy on the part of MacKinnon, whom Indianapolis city council members per-
ceived as conservative, and who impliedly did nothing to correct that perception. P. 113. 
17. West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 654 (1990). 
18. Pp. 194, 197. West characterizes "legal conservatives" as those who believe that the state 
"should defer to the vision of the good articulated in established, historically enshrined legal 
traditions, including, most significantly, constitutional histocy and common law precedents.'' 
West, supra note 17, at 655. 
19. See p. 196. 
20. Pp. 70-72, 79. West characterizes MacKinnon and other radical feminists as "anti-sub-
ordination progressives.'' 
The meaning of the good, for anti-subordination progressives, is negatively inferred from 
vacying experiences [either one's own or others'] of subordination, bondage and invasion. 
The sorts of experiences of inequality that inform anti-subordinationist politics and legal 
thought are vast. They include, for example, the daily, numbing joylessness of a materially 
impoverished existence; the self-contempt from being regarded as essentially less than 
human, less than whole, less than entitled, or less than respected; the pain of being a target 
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Downs' extensive discussion of what he considers to be the tainted 
legislative processes that passed the anti-pornography ordinances is in-
tended to show the lack of both communitarian and legal authority 
behind the ordinances.21 If the ordinances had been passed through 
the most pure of legislative processes, and were fully backed by com-
munity support, they too might warrant some degree of accommoda-
tion.22 Thus, Downs' argument rests on the legitimacy of 
communitarian authority as opposed to the legitimacy of conceptions 
of the good derived from individual, idealist perceptions.23 
By Downs' own account, he is "not concerned with broader ques-
tions of social life but rather with the roles of competing political theo-
ries as they relate to free speech law and policy" (p. xvi). 
Unfortunately, this self-imposed constraint makes Downs' conclusions 
too easy. The pornography debate has been raging on a substantive 
level for too many years to be glossed over by assumptions that com-
munity authority is inherently more legitimate than idealistic radical 
approaches. Yet once Downs has established to his satisfaction that 
the liberal model of the first amendment is valid, he believes he need 
not address the substantive inequalities that the progressive model of 
the first amendment intends to correct. 
of hatred and abuse; the dehumanization of being an object of property, of sexuality, or of 
another's goals and ambitions; the general day-to-day horror of being systematically less-
ened or "handicapped" so that another can feel whole; of being systematically dirtied or 
polluted, so that another can feel pure and clean; of being systematically rendered contin-
gent, natural, bodily, of the dirt, or of the earth, so that another can feel transcendantal, 
free, spiritual or rational; and of being systematically perverted, bent and marginalized so 
that another can feel normal, straight and central. 
West, supra note 17, at 685. 
21. Downs' discussion shows that the ordinances lacked the sort of pervasive societal support 
that he attributes to the obscenity doctrine, and thus, in the social conservative view, do not 
warrant an exception to the liberal model of the first amendment. It is unclear, however, with 
what level of legal illegitimacy Downs intends to charge the Minneapolis and Indianapolis city 
councils. The symbolic campaigns that so disconcert Downs are not unusual to legislative fo-
rums, see generally M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC UsES OF PoLmcs (1964); neither are votes 
cast to protect political reputations. For example, Senator Lowell Weicker implied that Mem-
bers of Congress and Senators voted for the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act in 
order to avoid appearing "pro-deficit." See Roberts, Drive to End Deficits: Odd Bedfellows, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at B18, col. 1. Downs thus does not make clear how purely democratic the 
legislative process must be in order to attain legitimate legal status. 
22. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 616. However, even unified societal support for the mea-
sure would perhaps not warrant full accommodation in Downs' view. According to Downs, the 
liberal model of the first amendment "may entertain non-liberal values in areas of expression that 
do not directly impinge on its political and intellectual core." P. 197. According to Downs, the 
radical feminist model directly cuts to this political and intellectual core because of its "stunning 
disrespect ... toward art and intellectual freedom and its disdain for the link3 between sexual 
portrayal and knowledge." P. 155. However, if it were possible to classify pornography as 
speech closely aligned to action, and thus unprotected, the feminist prohibition on sexually de-
grading materials might be justified. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. 
23. The radical feminist anti-pornography model is inconsistent with communitarian author-
ity because it denies the validity of societal consensus, on the grounds that individual choice is 
not possible in a patriarchal society, see p. 39, and rejects societal norms because they perpetuate 
preexisting hierarchies. See p. 37. 
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By assuming the legitimacy of social authority, as opposed to ideal-
istic authority, Downs fails to meet MacKinnon and Dworkin on their 
own ground. Radical feminists assert that pornography denies them 
the opportunity to participate in the "marketplace of ideas." In the 
words of Catharine MacKinnon, 
Pornography strips and devastates women of credibility, from our ac-
counts of sexual assault to our everyday reality of sexual subordination. 
We are stripped of authority and reduced and devalidated and silenced. 
Silenced here means that the purposes of the First Amendment, pre-
mised upon conditions presumed and promoted by protecting free 
speech, do not pertain to women because they are not our conditions. 24 
By devaluing women as speakers, pornography creates a failure of the 
"marketplace of ideas." It is this market failure that anti-pornography 
ordinances intend to correct.2s 
Downs supports the liberal model of the first amendment because 
he asserts the model is conducive to freedom, while the "progressive 
censorship" model is not. Indeed, he warns feminist critics that "they 
would seem ill advised to cast away a doctrine and its institutional 
supports that provide their radicalism with an opportunity to be 
heard" (p. 151). Yet this argument assumes the presence of freedom. 
Radical feminists may agree that the liberal model is more conducive 
to men's freedom of speech. Yet they assert that the liberal model 
oppresses women's speech. Downs' argument assumes the invalidity 
of this proposition without support. If both models are oppressive, 
Downs would need to show that the harm the progressive model poses 
to male speech is greater than the harm the liberal model poses to 
women. Since he avoids issues of substantive equality altogether, he is 
unable to do so, and instead assumes what he needs to prove.26 By 
assuming the nonoppressiveness of the liberal model, and the oppres-
siveness of progressive censorship, Downs need only ground his argu-
ments in a negative conception of state neutrality. Thus, the anti-
pornography ordinances need not be dealt with as efforts to achieve 
substantive equality, but are treated as attempts to "favor" feminist 
24. MacKinnon, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED 163, 193 (1987). 
25. The liberal doctrine of state neutrality "presuppose[s] that whole segments of the popula-
tion are not systematically silenced socially, prior to government action." C. MACKINNON, 
supra note 11, at 206. If this presumption is incorrect, some corrective mechanism must be 
incorporated into the neutrality model in order to maintain its integrity. Thus, market correc· 
tion is not fundamentally inconsistent with the liberal model of state neutrality, but rather, is 
necessary to maintain the model. MacKinnon has expressed this consistency: "It is the same 
social goal, just other people." C. MACKINNON, supra note 11, at 205 (emphasis added). 
26. Downs briefly addresses the argument of women's societal disempowerment in saying 
that, "[a]lthough cowed and disempowered women do tragically exist, they are likely a minority 
among women." P. 70. Downs lists no support for this assertion, nor does he set forth his 
definition of "disempowerment." 
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viewpoints in the first amendment arena. 27 
Even if one assumes the validity of the liberal model of the first 
amendment, however, it is not obvious that the anti-pornography ordi-
nance is an effort to favor feminist viewpoints and disfavor misogynis-
tic viewpoints. The radical feminist critique is not simply an objection 
to "the content of the ideas advocated by [pornographic] material" (p. 
153). Rather, it asserts that pornography itself is an act of 
degradation: 
[P]ornography is more act-like than thought-like. The fact that pornog-
raphy, in a feminist view, furthers the idea of the sexual inferiority of 
women, a political idea, does not make the pornography itself a political 
idea. That one can express the idea a practice embodies does not make 
that practice into an idea. Pornography is not an idea any more than 
segregation is an idea, although both institutionalize the idea of the infer-
iority of one group to another .... In a feminist perspective, pornogra-
phy is the essence of a sexist social order, its quintessential social act.28 
In the radical feminist view, pornography is a political act, rather than 
an expression of a political idea. Contrary to the assumptions of the 
marketplace of ideas metaphor, more speech will not remedy the harm 
because the act of pornography has devalued any speech that may oc-
cur in response. 29 The ordinance would not restrict speakers from ar-
guing that women should be considered "sexual objects, things, or 
commodities."30 Rather, it restricts depictions that actually turn wo-
men into sexual objects, things? or commodities.31 
In this sense, pornography is more akin to action than to political 
27. Seep. 7 (quoting Tigue, Civil Rights and Censorship, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 81, 93 
(1985)). 
28. MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 335. 
29. MacKinnon asks and answers this question for radical feminists: 
Would more speech, rather than less, remedy the harm? In the end, the answer may be yes, 
but not under the abstract system of free speech, which only enhances the power of the 
pornographers while doing nothing substantively to guarantee the free speech of women, for 
which we need civil equality. The situation in which women presently find ourselves with 
respect to the pornography is one in which more pornography is inconsistent with rectifying 
or even counterbalancing its damage through speech, because so long as the pornography 
exists in the way it does there will not be more speech by women. 
MacKinnon, supra note 3, at 63. 
30. See supra note 4. 
31. According to MacKinnon: 
Pornography is a set of bermeneutical equivalences that work on the epistemological level. 
Substantively, pornography defines the meaning of what a woman is by connecting access to 
her sexuality with masculinity through orgasm. The behavioral data show that what por-
nography means is what it does. 
MacKinnon, supra note 3, at 59. Thus, radical feminists argue that pornography "creates the 
experience of a sexuality which is itself objectified." C. MACKINNON, supra note 11, at 199. 
Pornography does not merely advocate sexual hierarchy; it creates that hierarchy. 
Frederick Schauer bas made a similar argument in the context of obscenity law. Schauer 
argues that obscenity, even though it may consist of speech, is not "speech" because the receiver 
does not receive it as a communication, but rather as "a purely physical response." Schauer, 
Speech and ''Speech" - Obscenity and "Obscenity'~· An Exercise in the Interpretation of Consti-
tutional Language, 61 GEo. L.J. 899, 922 (1979). 
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expression. Downs recognizes that the liberal doctrine of the first 
amendment "makes a basic, if imperfect and inexact, distinction be-
tween speech and action. Speech is protected unless it constitutes un-
lawful or tortious action or is directly tied to unlawful action, such as 
libel, incitement, solicitation, conspiracy or the like" (p. 5). Again, 
Downs relies on legal conclusions. The determination of whether 
speech is lawful or unlawful is distinct from the determination of 
whether that speech is "speech" protected by the first amendment, or 
"action" that falls outside of the first amendment. Feminists assert 
that pornography is "action," and therefore unprotected by the first 
amendment. Accordingly, they seek legislation to make pornography 
an "unlawful or tortious action." Downs, however, denies the legiti-
macy of such efforts by showing the procedural faults and lack of soci-
etal support behind such legislative efforts. 32 
By denying the validity of the anti-pornography ordinance on 
grounds of social authority, Downs denies the validity of the entire 
radical feminist movement. Radical feminism originates outside of, 
rather than from within, society. It relies on the experiences of indi-
viduals and on an idea of equality perceived within the interstices of a 
patriarchal society. Those experiences and perceptions have been 
brought forward slowly and painfully through "consciousness raising" 
- a process of listening to and sharing women's stories.33 To Downs, 
these stories are "anecdotal" evidence (p. 79) whose primary purpose 
is catharsis (pp. 68, 71-73). Although Downs acknowledges that 
"meaningful social change may result when private psychological suf-
fering is transformed into public language," he warns that "such poli-
tics can also unleash an emotionalism and intolerance which threaten 
the perspective and civility required by healthy public life" (p. 68). 
Indeed, it is the "uncompromising rage" of the radical feminists 
that offends Downs.34 It seems that Downs believes that what radical 
feminists need is a good sense of humor. 35 Apparently he thinks they 
32. This explains why The New Politics of Pornography, spends 109 of 198 total pages (pp. 
34-143) scrutinizing the political processes of the Indianapolis and Minneapolis city councils, 
despite the fact that its purported goal is to establish the theoretical invalidity of radical feminist 
anti-pornography legislation. See p. xvi. 
33. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 11, at 83-105. 
34. See p. 69. Downs' (male) colleagues praise him for his objectivity: 
The hallmarks of this careful study are reason, empathy, and moderation. It is a welcome 
antidote to the blinkered ideologies that have dominated discussions of pornography, 
Downs gives both sides of the pornography debate a fair hearing, while patiently exposing 
the weaknesses of absolutist positions. This is the voice of a true scholar. 
David P. Bryden, Co-editor, Constitutional Commentary, quoted on book jacket of hardcover 
copy. 
35. Downs cites approvingly what he deems to be a Nietzschean perspective: 
According to this perspective, the gender separatism espoused by some radical feminists and 
lesbians and the sexual denial advocated by some conservatives are nihilistic because they 
represent a puristic recoiling from the inevitable travails of the heterosexual encounter. The 
absence of humor in so many of the conservative and feminist attacks on pornography is 
indicative of this suffocation of life, for laughter is the emotional bridge between human 
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are talcing it all too seriously when women are brutalized by both the 
production and consumption of pornography.36 Radical feminists' 
lack of humor blinds them to the artistic and human value of pornog-
raphy. To Downs, "the dangers of pornographic art are worth risking 
because the form engages [a] fundamental dialectic of our natures."37 
Of course, those women who have been victimized by pornography 
might not agree that the outcome of such a balancing test is so obvi-
ous. Maybe it is because they have not yet learned to laugh about it. 
- Rene L. Todd 
animality and reason. Laughter heals the pain of the cardinal split in human nature and is a 
sign of psychic health. The absence of humor is of a piece with the failure of the Minneapo-
lis ordinance to distinguish between artful and non-artful pornography. 
P. 181 (footnote omitted). These words mirror those often applied to victims of sexual harass-
ment in the workplace. See c. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 51-
52 (1979). 
36. Catharine MacKinnon relates the details of a Minnesota case of sexual abuse: 
[A] fourteen-year-old girl on a bicycle was stopped with a knife and forced into a car. Her 
hands were tied with a belt, she was pushed to the floor and covered with a blanket. The 
knife was then used to cut off her clothes, and fingers and a knife were inserted into her 
vagina. Then the man had her dress, drove her to a gravel pit, ordered her to stick a safety 
pin into the nipple of her left breast, and forced her to ask him to hit her. After hitting her, 
he forced her to commit fellatio and to submit to anal penetration, and made her use a 
cigarette to bum herself on her breast and near her pubic area. Then he defecated and 
urinated on her face, forced her to ingest some of the excrement and urine and made her 
urinate into a cup and drink it. He took a string from her blouse and choked her to the 
point of unconsciousness, leaving bum marks on her neck, and after cutting her with his 
knife in a couple of places, drove her back to where he had gotten her and let her go. The 
books that were found with this man were: Violent Stories of Kinky Humiliation, Violent 
Stories of Dominance and Submission, ... Bizarre Sex Crimes, Shamed Victims, and Water 
Sports Fetish, Enemas and Golden Showers. The Minnesota Supreme Court said "It appears 
that in committing these various acts, the defendant was giving life to some stories he had 
read in various pornographic books." 
MacKinnon, supra note 3, at 46-50. 
37. P. 182. Downs draws a parallel between pornography and alcohol abuse. Both, he 
states, are likely causal agents in abuse of women, yet the harm is not sufficient to justify prohibi-
tion of either. Pp. 165, 192. Yet the women's temperance movement was an attempt to mitigate 
the harms suffered by women whose lives depended on the productivity of their alcoholic hus-
bands. To economically powerless women, the harm was indeed sufficient to warrant prohibi-
tion. See generally, A. WITTENMYER, HISTORY OF THE WOMAN'S TEMPERANCE CRUSADE 
(1878). 
